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Trust as a Critical Concept 
 
 
By Anders Bordum 
 
Abstract 
 
    In this articlei I will argue that trust is a fundamental and critical concept 
because trust is the direct or transcendental constitutive ground of most 
social phenomena, as well as applicable as an operational method in critical 
theory. There are two different but overlapping positions on trust I address in 
this article. One is the standpoint we find in business strategy, that trust is 
naïve to show, and control or contracts are presumed better. In the strategy 
game the idealistic good guys seems to lose (Arrow 1974), (Williamson 
1975). The other position is the position taken by systems theory where trust 
is treated as if it was a value-neutral system-internal decision, which 
presupposes that trust and mistrust are symmetrically interrelated functionally 
(Luhmann 1979). In his early book Trust and Power, Niklas Luhmann seems 
to agree with the vision guiding my general argument that there is a need for 
clear directions and specifications in organisations and systems as to whether 
trust or distrust is appropriate and rational (Luhmann 1979:93). Yet I 
challenge these positions described above with an alternative understanding 
inspired by Jürgen Habermas which can be applied as an operational 
strategy for analyzing trust in its’ empirical and social distribution, without 
ignoring the questions of validity in real social settings where trust is actively 
playing a direct or indirect constitutional role in the foundation of most 
interactions, organisations, institutions, and societies. 
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 The Function of Trust 
 
   There is generally no disagreement that trust has a social function reducing 
the complexity of social life (Luhmann 1979:71). There is no doubt that the 
objective world is more complex than any system, and that systems need to 
reduce complexity in order to function as systems, as Luhmann explains 
(Luhmann 1979:32). Furthermore it is a fact that reality as a whole is too 
complex to know in its’ entirety and to control instrumentally. With increasing 
complexity the need for assurances such as trust grows accordingly 
(Luhmann 1979:13). This goes back to a basic need to be able to have 
confidence in one’s own expectations and beliefs, and to be able to exhibit 
self-control regarding the realization of one’s desires (Luhmann 1979:4). The 
question is just how does trust reduce the complexity? Both a functional and 
an intentional strategy are suggested. The functional strategy sees trust as a 
system-internal anticipation of disappointment of expectations (Luhmann 
1979:79). Luhmann argues against the intentional strategy by saying that it is 
based on a misunderstanding that “stable structures within persons could be 
founded on unstable structures within their environment” (Luhmann 1979:79). 
Contrary to Luhmann’s position I am suggesting that we combine an 
intentional explanatory approach with an approach focused on the question of 
intersubjective validity. The need for performative certainty (Habermas 
2003:253) and the need to be able to distinguish things (Aristotle) are part of 
the reason why we need to be able to trust our own knowledge and why we 
demand validity. Luhmann’s position to a certain extent contradicts the need 
for knowledge or excludes the possibility of having knowledge at all. A major 
difference between Luhmann and Habermas on this point is whether such 
reduction of complexity should be systems-based functional reduction of 
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complexity or intentional and validity-based. My argument is supporting the 
intentional knowledge-based reduction of complexity, where empirical 
analysis of trust and its’ social distribution is always connected with validity 
claims. Even though trust often functions as implicitly taken for granted or as 
a tacit presupposition, it can be made explicit in empirical analysis following 
the strategy that “whatever can be meant can be said” (Searle 1988:19-20) 
(Habermas 2001:4). We can thus say that whatever can be trusted can be 
declared trustworthy. The problem with a validity-oriented strategy on trust is 
that a pure cognitive or knowledge-based approach to trust seems to be 
naïve as presented in the next section. But even though we may never base 
our trust on secure knowledge, we need reflectively to be able to trust our 
knowledge – this is an essential part of epistemology. Since we can trust 
analytic knowledge which is necessarily true a priori we cannot, as is often 
done, reduce all aspects of trust to being empirical and contingent, even 
though the contingent is the field where trust has its’ main function.  
 
 
 
Knowledge and Trust 
 
     It is a concrete problem that we don’t know when it is sensible to 
demonstrate trust, and when mistrust is more appropriate.  The problem 
continues, fed by doubt, if we consider whether we have trust in our 
knowledge.  In our daily lives, knowledge can confirm our trust or mistrust if 
we understand knowledge as well justified true beliefs (Bordum 2000).  We 
normally expect rational persons to be able to justify their beliefs to 
themselves and others (Brandom 1994, Scanlon 1998).  In principle this also 
applies to a declaration of trust or mistrust, that it can be substantiated.  
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There can be a difference in silently demonstrating or presuming trust and 
declaring trust.  Trust declarations and knowledge claims look like one 
another on certain points in and with that they are explicit and can require a 
justification.  Knowledge can be used as foundation to create additional trust 
or mistrust.  Confronted with ignorance, uncontrollability, unpredictability, 
insincerity, and incomprehensibility, we often find reason to demonstrate trust 
anyway for the lack of a better option.  We can call this form of powerless 
trust a cognitively naïve trust.  The problem is that our declaration of trust in 
the end is always cognitively naïve and cannot be completely substantiated.  
By blind I mean that every declaration of trust or mistrust is fallible, in other 
words has the potential for error, and can show itself to be incorrect.  In this 
article I will furthermore argue that there is an asymmetrical relationship 
between trust and mistrust.  We cannot, for example, anchor our trust in 
knowledge, but we can well anchor our mistrust in exact knowledge, even 
though declarations of mistrust can also be in error. 
     Trust is something which we ascribe in a relationship between us and 
something else in a given situation.  There are therefore at least four 
essential elements, which may vary:  the situation; we who ascribe trust; the 
trust which is ascribed; that to which we ascribe trust.  We can have trust in 
such very different objects as things, functionality, systems, persons, 
structures, organizations, controlling mechanisms, trains of thought, 
propositions, and knowledge.  When we ascribe trust to ourselves we often 
call it self-confidence. If we were not convinced that the saw blade was 
fastened tightly to the buzz saw, or the chain was properly attached to the 
chainsaw, we would not use them.  If we were not convinced that workmen 
had set their scaffolding up correctly, we would not go under it.  If we did not 
trust that our brakes worked, and that the other drivers drove on the same 
side as us, we would not dare to drive out in traffic.  We normally have trust 
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that things and systems in our surrounding world are working.  We would not 
at all be able to function instrumentally in the world if we didn’t presuppose a 
minimum of trust, if we didn’t as a basic assumption and point of departure 
expect that things function.  Each practice would become an infinite 
regression of tests of whether things were as we were convinced they were 
and expected them to be, and no instrumental action could be realized. 
     So it is also with social actions. As Max Weber writes, social actions can 
be oriented towards other persons’ past, present, and expected future actions 
(Weber 1978:22).  Trust is mainly directed at the present and future, and less 
relevant regarding the past. In order for an action to become social, the 
person who acts, in their subjective understanding of the action, takes into 
account, relates to, and orients themselves to others’ actions (Weber 1978:4). 
We must presuppose a modicum of trust, not only in connection with 
instrumental actions in relation to an object, but also in connection with social 
actions in relation to other people, before these actions can be realized 
(Gambetta 1988:219).  When social processes are successful we can see 
that trust can generate trust, and that trust can both appear as a precondition 
for and as a product of social action.  It becomes obvious that we with both 
instrumental and social actions must presuppose trust, if we, as in the 
following examples, look at situations characterized by mistrust.  If complete 
mistrust reigns, the cooperation between free and equal persons cannot be 
realized. 
 
The Undesirable Situations 
 
(A) Thomas Hobbes described life in a natural state, where no-one 
could have trust to each other as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short (Hobbes 1985:186).”  If no-one trusted each other life would be 
 7
dangerous for even the biggest and strongest, in that the weaker could 
easily join forces and, for example, attack from the back.  As a result 
the weaker would then wage war upon one another.  Whether the state 
of nature is imagined or real, no-one could know themselves to be 
secure in such a state of nature.  Being unarmed in the state of nature 
is to show trust, but is a risky behaviour. One would never be able to 
trust the others, even if one could have trust in one’s knowledge that 
the others would always present a threat.  The condition is foreseeable 
and would, according to Hobbes, exactly therefore find its’ natural berth 
around self-preservation realized as self-defence.  Self-preservation 
and self defence would be thus a condition, a norm, and every 
individual’s natural right.  The natural state is, although created for the 
sake of argument, an undesirable state, among other reasons because 
no-one can have trust in others. 
(B) The sociologist Talcott Parsons believed that double-contingency 
is a fundamental condition for all social action.  This is because we 
cannot immediately know with confidence what we and others will do in 
a future situation.  Double-contingency arises when actor A acts 
contingent upon what actor B does, and B’s actions are conditioned by 
what A does.  Double-contingency creates an indecisive and unstable 
social relation, which in fact makes the social action impossible, if it 
does not become absorbed.  Future-oriented actions are often 
uncertain, unpredictable, and characterized by such a double 
contingency.  In a condition characterized by such a contingency one 
would not be able to have trust in either one’s own or another’s actions, 
on the basis of the inherent insecurity and unpredictability. 
(C) Many economists’ theories, for example the neoclassic, have as an 
invariable fundamental assumption that actors on the market, like the 
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ideal type construction economic man (homo oeconomicus), are 
egoistic individuals concerned with maximizing their own personal 
benefit.  They know all and can all, but are finally only interested in their 
own gain, and not in the other actors.  They are essentially acting on 
price information only. Maximizing of own personal benefit should in 
theory, and under the presupposition of a functionally coordinating 
invisible hand on the market, be motive enough to get all workforce, 
money, goods, and service exchange to function without glitches or 
transaction-costs.  On the market, one can trust that the others will 
optimize their own, but for the same reason one cannot have trust in the 
actors themselves.  It is, as in the natural state, quite predictable that all 
will optimize the benefit for themselves, but is not necessarily desirable 
and trust inspiring behaviour.  It is a line of thought which assumes that 
all are unknown and not obliged to each other, and that they wish to 
remain as such. The logic of market competition is self-propelling and 
apparently impossible to get out of, and is characterized by imperatives 
to be competitive or lose, to innovate or die.  As Hartmut Rosa has 
pointed out, societies based on market economics face challenges of 
accelerating social processes which have negative effects on those 
sub-systems incapable of social acceleration (Rosa 2003). The line of 
thought concerning maximization of own personal benefit has been 
formalized in the mathematical game theory, which is used as an 
analytical tool by both economists and those who work in the realm of 
political science.  One of these formalized games is called the 
prisoner’s dilemma.  The prisoner’s dilemma is an example of a game 
where the actors attempt to choose a strategy based upon expectations 
of which strategy the other actor will choose.  The prisoners are 
suspected of having robbed a bank together, and they are held 
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separately after the arrest.  The police lack conclusive evidence.  Both 
prisoners are promised that they will get reduced sentencing if they are 
themselves not guilty, and will implicate the other.  If the prisoners do 
not get the opportunity to speak with each other, they become trapped 
in the double-contingency dilemma, and choose the least stable and 
least optimal social relation.  The result of double-contingency is that 
both prisoners have rational grounds to implicate each other, which 
they thus do.  Situations which appear as the prisoner’s dilemma are 
undesirable and will, even if they are very predictable, only confirm 
mistrust between prisoners. 
 
     Whether the model is Thomas Hobbes’ natural state, Talcott Parsons’ 
double contingency, or neoclassic economic theory, they are all 
individualistic.  They exemplify which undesirable conditions we can 
experience in the natural state, with the double contingency, or where 
others maximize their own personal benefit at one’s expense in zero-sum 
games.  The situations are formally predictable, but can at the same time 
in their content justify why we can’t under the given circumstances have 
trust in the individual actors. 
     It is obvious that unless the characteristic state of structurally created 
and infinite mistrust is in one way or another dissolved, social stability, 
coordinated action, and the like can in no way take place.  What the 
models have in common is that the consequence of the individual’s 
freedom and autonomy is the others’ uncertain and incontrollable actions.  
The social meeting easily becomes a social collision, when mistrust 
becomes written into the interpretative frame.  That which lies as a core 
exception in the arguments is that all have cognitive grounds to expect that 
all use their freedom to eliminate the others’ freedom.  The only thing we 
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can do in opposition is to eliminate their freedom.  It is the structure and 
the implicit presupposed infinite mistrust that lead to the best defence 
being an attack.  The natural state, civil war, or a struggle for power are 
naturally the results of such a line of thought. 
     The models have the amazing characteristic that to have mistrust in the 
others becomes rational.  A mistrust which is often self-referential and self-
amplifying. The models force us to attribute to the others motives which 
work against our own objective interest in survival, to cooperate, and to 
make a fair exchange of goods.  Therefore there lies also as a hidden 
normative premise in the models that state of nature, double contingency, 
and collective sub-optimizing are undesirable states for the actors.   
     Culture, common knowledge, norms, promises, institutions, family 
structures, local informal social cooperation and other relations are in 
practice all used to dissolve the state of nature, double contingency, and 
the infinite mistrust to the other actors which are the consequence of the 
models.  Sometimes there is a merging between one’s own interests and 
everyone’s interests.  We must often choose and evaluate whether we 
have trust in other people acting in agreement with their own interests, or 
whether we have trust in that they will live up to mutual obligation and act 
in agreement with a common or agreed upon interest. 
 
 
Trust is Created in the Light of Expectations 
 
     There is widespread professional agreement that trust as a concept is tied 
to expectations.  We can relatively easily paraphrase sentences where the 
word trust appears, replacing the word trust with the word expectation, 
without significant loss of meaning.  We can, on the other hand, not 
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meaningfully paraphrase all sentences in which the word expectation 
appears, with the word trust as a replacement.  The reason for this is perhaps 
that the concept trust is positively value-laden, while expectation is attributed 
no value in itself, but expresses a relation to the subjective world.  Different 
expectations meet when people meet. 
 
“Expectations can be thought of as the basic stuff or ingredient of 
social interaction, as matter is the basic stuff of the physical world.  
Expectations are the meanings actors attribute to themselves and 
others as they make choices about which actions and reactions are 
rationally effective and emotionally and morally appropriate.  All 
social interaction is an endless process of acting upon 
expectations, which are part cognitive, part emotional, and part 
moral (Barber 1983:9).” 
 
     The creation of expectations and trust functions as a sort of a social laying 
down of cards of who and what one wishes interaction with now and in the 
future.  That and those with whom we don’t interact we have no need to 
demonstrate or have trust in.  The unknown and strange can be frightening, 
while we have trust in that which looks like that we already know, and in those 
who look like ourselves.  Erving Goffman formulates the point with the social 
laying down of cards and the relationship to trust with regard to the staged in 
distinction to what goes on “backstage”. 
 
 “It is apparent that if performers are concerned with maintaining a 
line they will select as team-mates those who can be trusted to 
perform properly.  Thus children of the house are often excluded 
from performances given for guests of a domestic establishment 
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because often children cannot be trusted to behave themselves, 
i.e., to refrain from acting in a way inconsistent with the impression 
that is being fostered (Goffman 1978:95-96).” 
 
     A declaration of trust is seen in this light as not just a social blank check 
which the receiver themselves can fill out, it is also a kind of risk-calculated 
preference, in that there lies an active choice of those and that one we will 
interact with.  In Goffman’s example, children are evaluated to be less reliable 
than adults, and are therefore excluded as cooperative partners in the grand 
staging of self.  We especially need trust as a means to secure continued 
social interaction when we face unclarity, insecurity, and a lack of knowledge.  
Trust functions as a social stabiliser and justifies a continued interaction 
which is unchanged, while mistrust justifies changing or breaking off the 
interaction. 
     Trust is, as legitimacy, something which others attribute and accordingly 
something which cannot be instrumentally controlled, owned, stored, etc.  If 
we ask who determines trust, the answer is always the other.  Expectations 
are of a special magnitude not necessarily anchored in reality, but in what is 
not yet actual.  We can speak of true or false expectations as long as 
expectations are empirical and deal with that which is.  As an emotional 
function, which is subjectively or normatively anchored, expectations can 
either be fulfilled or disappointed.  There is therefore no unambiguous 
sensible compulsion for the creation of expectations.  Expectations are as 
different as people.  Like desires, expectations can be kept on normative 
grounds even when they are in disagreement with reality. An essential social 
function is therefore to mutually stabilize expectations between people.  If we 
look at promises for example, their goal is often to stabilize others’ 
expectations (Weber 1978:28).  The most important role of norms is to 
 13
dissolve double contingency by mutually stabilizing normative expectations in 
the light of common knowledge.  The promise is easily the most trust inspiring 
arrangement we have.  The apology and forgiveness constitute one of the 
most trust rebuilding social mechanisms we have.  But they also rest, in the 
final analysis, upon a foundation of trust which is essentially blind and fallible.  
Think simply of those who automatically offer the excuse and count 
beforehand on forgiveness.  The promise, the disappointment, the excuse, 
and the forgiveness are all mechanisms which can be activated when 
expectations are not answered by that which is actually the case. 
 
 
The Cognitively Naïve Trust 
 
     Trust creating mechanisms do not create trust.  They are insecurity 
minimizing mechanisms.  Pharmacies do not operate in a free market, but in 
a regulated market with the goal to uphold the trust that they sell us the 
correct and not the most profitable medicine.  Political decisions should best 
be public, and the political process should be monitored by the public to work 
against power becoming in itself sufficient and corrupting.  The public is often 
used as a monitoring mechanism to stabilize trust. Publicity secures the 
separation of the private and the public as well as minimize actions carried 
out in self-interest (Weber 1978:957).  Our expectations can be disappointed, 
and trust turn to mistrust.  Processes where mistrust turns to trust are much 
slower and more time demanding than the processes where trust is changed 
to mistrust.  This is because trust, like experience and knowledge, is built up 
over time.  According to Anthony Giddens, trust shall, in order to be active, be 
created and won.  One cannot simply demand or presuppose that it is present 
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(Bech 1999:130, 116).  Even experts must constantly prove their 
trustworthiness and accountability in a modern reflexive society. 
     When we have expectations which concern an atomic power plant’s 
security, for example, expectations are of an epistemic magnitude.  It is not 
the atomic power plant in itself which we have trust in, but a relationship 
between our expectations and the atomic power plant. Trust is a concept of 
validity, which like truth, neither belongs solely to the judging person, nor to 
the object judged (Cf. Habermas 2003:90, 227). A theory, which views trust 
as something other than a concept of validity and as something we judge 
about something else, and which therefore is always interpreted and infected 
by theory, misunderstands this.  Trust is always related to our knowledge 
about the objects of trust. When we have knowledge by acquaintance we 
have no reason to distrust our knowledge, although we may distrust the 
object. Regarding know how, we are committed to trust that the desired 
alternative situation is desirable, and that means are available to the desired 
end. We trust the instrumental functionality. In the case of propositional 
knowledge, we need to trust in the justification justifying a belief as valid, as 
well as trust that an entailed action is secure because justified. We can 
interpret a declaration of trust as a linguistic judgement, as an evaluation of 
our expectations of something else.  If trust were made explicit, it would have 
the form of the declaration of trust and the empirical linguistic judgement.  
The process in which a judgement is made can thereby be understood as 
analogous to learning processes, because we can only afterwards experience 
whether we have judged wrongly and have trusted the wrong one, and can 
first hereafter revise our judgement.  We declare and interpret trust as a 
judgement, and revise trust in the light of our experience and learning 
process.  We can, according to the fallibilistic doctrine that our empirical 
knowledge never is secure, because in the future it can reveal itself to be 
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false, never be absolutely sure that our beliefs and expectations hold.  
Charles Sanders Peirce defined the doctrine thus:  “. . . fallibilism is the 
doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute, but always swims, as it were, 
in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy (Peirce 1958 vol. I§171).”  
According to theorists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, Karl Popper, Karl 
Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas, this is a condition for all forms of empirical 
knowledge.  In the end we cannot even have definitive trust in our knowledge, 
but only in our own willingness and ability to learn. Therefore there will always 
be an element of insecurity bound to trust understood as a form of linguistic 
judgement.  When we explicate and put forth our expectations positively, 
there will always be alternative possibilities and a blind spot we cannot justify, 
control, foresee, or rule over.  Declared trust will therefore in the end always 
be cognitively naïve in the meaning fallible, and will therefore have an 
element of unfounded faith (Giddens 1994:34).  
     There are, as I see it, two further substantial reasons that declared trust is 
cognitively naïve; 
     The first reason that declared trust becomes blind is that we do not have 
access to secure predictions which give insight into the future.  
Unpredictability and the possibility for change, that things could be different, 
are problems which refer to a future.  The necessary may be foreseen with 
security; that is not the case with the empirical and contingent. 
     Trust based on experience contains a logically invalid inductive 
generalization, in the assumption that what we can experience and observe in 
the present will also be valid in the future.  Experience is a strong knowledge-
base when concerning the past, but it is weak when concerning the future.  
The problem with the experienced based and positively grounded declaration 
of trust is that it is particularly in relation to a given future that trust has its’ 
function.  Trust and mistrust are expectations anchored in the present, aimed 
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at that which will be the case in the future.  David Hume was already attentive 
to the phenomenon that we often in error make past experiences standards 
for our future judgements.  Expectations are in their function aimed towards a 
future, despite their grounding in the present, according to Niklas Luhmann 
(Luhmann 1979:12).  “To show trust is to anticipate the future.  It is to behave 
as though the future was certain (Luhmann 1979:10).”  It is the idea that the 
future will be identical with the past which is ungrounded and often will show 
itself to be false. 
     Because trust most often functions in relation to states or other people’s 
actions in the future, it is difficult to avoid the element of invalid inductive 
generalization.  Inductive generalization as David Hume understood it, as a 
faulty naturalistic inference assuming that because it is valid in the past, so is 
it valid for all the future.  But also inductive generalization in the meaning that 
since Aristotle has been the paradigmatic form for induction, understood as a 
generalizing inference that something that is valid for some, therefore likely 
becomes valid for all (Holland 1986:230). Inductive generalization, in the 
aforementioned examples, concludes from the past to the future and from 
some to all.  None of these resulting conclusions can be finally validated if we 
with the concept “all” mean all cases at all times.  We cannot, for instance, 
believe that all accountants are trustworthy now and in the future, without 
committing an inductive fallacy. The problem with a trust concept based 
positively on experiences is that such a concept of trust, used to stabilize 
expectations to future relations, does not avoid invalid inductive conclusions.  
Nelson Goodman formulates the problem as: 
 
“Predictions, of course, pertain to what has not yet been observed.  
And they cannot be logically inferred from what has been 
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observed; for what has happened imposes no logical restrictions 
on what will happen (Goodman 1972:371).” 
 
     Ulrich Beck, in the light of his thesis on the risk society, formulates the 
lacking connection between past and future as:  “The concept of risk reverses 
the relationship of past, present and future.  The past loses its power to 
determine the present (Beck 1999:137).”  
     The second reason that trust becomes blind and naïve is known as the 
problem of other minds: that we don’t have immediate access to others’ 
consciousness or mental processes and therefore do not have secure insight 
into others people’s minds. Others’ intentions and action plans are invisible 
for us, unless they choose to mediate them to us communicatively.  And even 
then we cannot know these with certainty in that the communication could be 
insincere.  The conception of trust which is dealt with above presupposes 
either that mistrust is ignored or that trust and mistrust are assumed to be 
symmetrical by nature. In combination, people’s free will, the problem of other 
people’s minds, fallibility regarding empirical knowledge, and the inductive 
character of trusting make up a conclusive argument. Declared trust always 
becomes cognitively naïve, because we don’t have the ability to foresee the 
future and do not have direct access to others’ consciousness and plans of 
action.   
    The conclusion of the above stated arguments is that positively grounded 
or experienced based trust, which is built up over time and which has its’ 
functional role in relationship to the future, runs into problems with invalid 
induction and the unpredictability of the future.  The trust which is declared or 
simply demonstrated will therefore always be blind in the meaning fallible.  
Such a conclusion makes trusting naïve and contradicts that most social 
processes could not be explained without trust as a fundamental 
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presupposition, and contradicts that trust is critical. This conclusion changes if 
we bring in both trust and mistrust as premise for our analysis, and also take 
the pragmatic and functional necessity into account, where trust becomes 
constitutive for social action. Socially, trust is not naïve but a functional 
presupposition for many desired social phenomena.  
 
 
Trust and Mistrust are of Asymmetrical Magnitudes. 
 
     In our intercourse with the world and each other, for counter-factual 
grounds it becomes necessary to demonstrate and presume trust.  Trust is a 
condition for many social processes.  A counter-factual foundation for trust’s 
constitutive character could be that a given process could not at all progress 
without trust being present between the parties.  In a counter-factual 
inference, something or other, Q, is determined by something or other, P, in a 
way which cannot be truth-functional and therefore doesn’t belong to the 
formal logic.  A counter-factual relationship between P and Q does not 
express a formal logical relationship, but more likely causal connections or 
family relationships (Quine 1982:23).  An inference as in “if there were no 
oxygen I could not breathe,” is true and valid, not for logical formal grounds, 
but for causal.  Even though trust declarations are fallible and blind, we must 
for counter-factual reasons show trust, because many social meetings and 
social constructions would not at all take place without being anchored in 
trust.  Trust appears often as a necessary precondition for the progression of 
other social processes.  Money media, power media, judicial media, and 
scientific knowledge production build, for example, on a cognitively unjustified 
trust, which is a precondition for their functioning socially as mediating 
processes (Luhmann 1979:48).  The justification for our having to show trust 
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is the counter-factual that if we wish that certain social phenomenon shall be 
able to exist and function, we must necessarily construct them upon or 
around trust relations (also even though we know theoretical analysis as in 
the aforementioned must conclude that this is naïve, because trust is naïve).  
The consequence of this argument is that trust is not normatively and socially 
naïve, but valuable and needed, which is just another asymmetry between 
trust and mistrust. This practical opposition between the functional and 
cognitive grounds for the declaration of trust arises primarily when we view 
trust independently of its’ opposite, mistrust, which is done in the 
aforementioned.  In the aforementioned, trust and mistrust are not specifically 
related.  It is my point that trust and mistrust, if they as a conceptual pair are 
understood as of binding and coherent magnitudes, alter the blindness and 
naiveté which is otherwise bound to a purely cognitively justified declaration 
of trust. 
     Trust and mistrust are not simple opposites (Giddens 1994:37).  We 
cannot conclude that because mistrust is not present, we have a trust-
relation.  Trust and mistrust exclude each other as descriptions and 
declarations, in that we cannot meaningfully at one and the same time and in 
every respect declare trust and mistrust.  It would be a contradiction and a 
meaningless declaration which no-one could obligate themselves to.  This is 
because trust and mistrust stand in an asymmetrical relation to each other as 
concepts.  It is my point that there is an asymmetrical relationship between 
trust and mistrust because the two phenomena in fact have different 
fundamental characteristics.  The difference is apparent in the asymmetry 
between the concepts trust and mistrust. 
     There must, for example, be infinitely many relations to substantiate trust 
positively, but only a single relation to justify mistrust (Bordum 1998:94-98) 
(Bordum 2001).  Trust is bound by a certain cognitive fallibility and blindness.  
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Mistrust does not necessarily presuppose the same form of blindness.  
Expectations may simply be disappointed a single time to rationally justify a 
declaration of mistrust.  Trust is built up and revised over time, but there shall 
be only a single disappointment of expectations, or a single experience which 
dissolves trust, before judgement can rightfully be altered, and mistrust 
declared.  In relation to time, an asymmetry lies inherent here, in that the logic 
for the building of trust and the break down of trust to mistrust are completely 
different.   
    It is in principle possible for a person to analyze things and operate with a 
highly differentiated conception of trust. I trust that the doctor can operate 
competently, but do not trust his driving. I trust that my wife is faithful, but do 
not trust that she can clean thoroughly. Such an atomistic or deconstructed 
trust based on single attributes, aspects or predicates is possible, but this is 
not how trust generally operates in social settings. A differentiated conception 
of trust has to be synthesized in order to be operational and would 
presuppose a kind of cost-benefit evaluation or an axiomatic ranking of 
judgments, which is in itself a complicated demand to fulfill, especially when 
the future has to be taken into account. In social settings trust usually opens 
up for possibilities and future action. Trust is sustained and reproduced when 
a person takes on the rational commitments expected of them. Not being 
committed may dissolve the trust relationship. According to Robert Brandom 
competent linguistic practitioners keep track of their own and each others’s 
commitment and entitlements, as deontic scorekeepers (Brandom 1994:142). 
Because of this ever working mutual deontic scorekeeping it is difficult or 
almost impossible to build trust on insincere or manipulated grounds. Building 
trust takes the redemption of obligation and commitment. In a sense we are 
all informal accountants of trust. Making it explicit provides us with a rather 
sensible tool to analyze social phenomena.  
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    The building of trust normally takes a long time.  The declaration of 
mistrust’s experience basis can, in contrast, be reaped in a short time.  The 
declaration of mistrust has no problem being generalized in the future and is 
not bound to any need to be deduced from other persons’ invisible and 
uncontrollable intentions and thereafter resulting unforeseeable plans of 
action, because it can be deduced from observable behaviour. 
     Mistrust gives the justification for breaking off or changing the type of 
interaction, while trust most often functions as a justification for continued and 
unchanged interaction. This is an example of functional asymmetry.  A 
declaration of mistrust can be well-grounded concretely and materially.  It is 
the declaration of trust as a singular and material passing of judgement which 
runs into problems with blindness.  As material declaration the asymmetry 
between trust and mistrust reveals itself in that only the declaration of trust 
becomes inductive and naïve.  Mistrust demands only a single 
disappointment of expectations.  Mistrust can be grounded singularly and 
finally with reference to risk, danger (Giddens 1994:37), insincere or deceitful 
expressive communication, or retrospectively with reference to breach of trust 
and factually disappointed expectations.  Mistrust can only indicate what one 
should not do, who one should not trust in, who one should not be dependent 
on, etc.  A well-grounded mistrust cannot lead the way in establishing who 
and what one can have trust in.  We can only naïvely hope that that and 
those who have not yet disappointed our expectations will not do it in the 
future either.  If one’s expectations have infinite mistrust as a point of 
departure, one cannot be disappointed, but only positively surprised that the 
negative expectations are not fulfilled.  The asymmetry in relation to trust 
reveals itself in the relation that the expectations we reflexively stabilize by 
showing trust can always be disappointed (Luhmann 1979:79).  The problem 
with recommending expectations of infinite mistrust is that this will dissolve 
 22
every possibility for functionality of social relations based on trust, and that 
such an expectations horizon would make social action impossible.  It is 
therefore in practice impossible to live consistently with a presupposition of 
infinite mistrust. 
     We can have well grounded mistrust in that a speaker is expressing 
themselves sincerely, as far as the content between the speakers’ speech 
and action is inconsistent.  A speakers’ sincerity can, in other words, be 
invalidated, but not be confirmed by other observers.  Trust is closely 
connected to the concept of validity claims. To each of the validity claims; 
cognitive truth, normative rightness, and speaker sincerity, there exists a 
corresponding form of insincerity (Bordum 1998:49).  There is asymmetry 
between sincerity and insincerity because we can have well grounded 
mistrust if an expression is not sincerely spoken.  On the other hand, we 
cannot base a well grounded trust on the understanding that an expression is 
sincerely spoken.  Sincerity is a necessary pragmatic, but not sufficient 
condition to create a well-justified trust.  Think of the executioner who says:  
“in a minute I will swing my axe and separate your head from your body.”  
The executioner speaks both truthfully and sincerely, but is certainly not a 
person one has trust in.  Trustworthiness is demonstrated in the willingness to 
stand by one’s word.  The executioner can be “trusted” but is not trustworthy, 
and does not inspire trust.  This is because, culturally seen, trust is defined as 
something positive, something which is good in itself. It is contrary to the 
nature of trust to see it as something negative, because mistrust does not 
exist in itself but is simply an expression of lack of trust. This a priori 
normativity lies also inherent in the thought that trust is normally better than 
mistrust, just as love is normally better than hate.  It lies in the culture and 
inherent in the language that trust is normally a desirable condition and 
mistrust is an undesirable condition.  An example of normativity and 
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attribution of value inherent in the language can be seen in that loyalty is 
good and wished for and disloyalty wrong and undesirable.  The demand of 
trustworthiness which the executioner lives up to can be more generally 
understood as a demand for performative consistency.  One does what one 
says, and says what one does.  Hypocrisy, insincerity, and deceit are 
examples of performative inconsistency, where a speaker does not feel 
bound by his words.  We have reason to perceive the executioner as an 
agent to be “trusted”, but there is something or other missing in the relation 
which gives a foundation to something which is in value positive, trustworthy, 
or good in itself, and confirms that we can have trust in the executioner.  An 
expression shall in a particular relation be understandable, true, correct, and 
sincere, and live up to the communicative action’s demands over time, before 
it can create a rational basis for a declaration of trust.  Trust and distrust can 
be understood as judgements we lay down over such different relations as 
persons, organizations, systems, things, communications media, and 
knowledge.  As with all judgements, we wish for a certain security that that 
which we judge in fact exists.  Therefore the question of truth and lie 
becomes relevant.  Falsehood and lies give reason to mistrust.  We also wish 
with every judgement that the judgement we apply is in fact normatively 
adequate.  We wish that our predictions of intention, behaviour, or 
functionality in fact hold.  We wish to avoid the insincerity problem that the 
others in the role of speaker lie consciously or unconsciously.  Trust is 
vulnerable and invalidated as soon as only a single validity claim shows itself 
to be unfulfilled. 
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Conclusion 
 
     I have shown here that there can be found several different asymmetries 
between trust and mistrust.  Trust seems to have a positive value both 
culturally and functionally which distrust does not have. Trust building takes 
time and functions inductively, whereas mistrust can be established quickly 
and justified by a single ground. Furthermore the new asymmetry arises that 
trust may be cognitively naïve to demonstrate but can socially and 
functionally be a necessity. The asymmetry means among other things that it 
is invalid to conclude from the absence of mistrust that there is therefore trust.  
The asymmetry also means that one cannot say terribly much about trust by 
referring to examples of mistrust.  The asymmetry shows therefore, that trust 
understood positively and based on experience cannot be established as 
well-justified true belief.  Distrust can, on the contrary, be declared well-
justified because a single experience is final and concrete.  The likelihood of 
being mistaken in a material judgment is rather low, even though sense 
betrayal and sources of error in perception of course can occur.  The 
declaration of trust is blinder than the declaration of mistrust.  The declaration 
of trust, according to the above arguments, never becomes cognitively secure 
and based on certain knowledge.  Although trust does not find as much 
cognitive support as one could hope, there can be a number of important 
social, functional, and moral reasons to declare trust, even taking into 
account the risk of being blind and becoming disappointed.  In the normative 
and expressive dimension, trust can be functionally justified without being 
naïve at all. It can in fact be unethical to declare mistrust without justified 
reason. A declaration of trust can only be unethical if it is not sincere. This 
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conclusion changes the strategic frame of self-propelling mistrust build into 
many theoretical systems. Finally, the arguments on asymmetry indicate that 
there is something inconsistent and invalid in the way Luhmann treats trust 
and mistrust as functionally equivalent value-neutral ways for a system to 
reduce complexity.ii  
   Most of those phenomena that critical theory is critical towards, for 
example, coercion, lying, irrationality, illegitimacy, instrumentalizing reason, 
etc., generate mistrust when analysed in concrete social settings, and are 
operationally sensitive to an analysis applying trust as its’ analytic 
perspective. Therefore trust is a critical concept, not just in the sense that 
most social processes in their foundation presuppose one form of trust or 
another, but also critical in the sense of a possible analytic perspective 
available to critical theorists who are seeking to make operational the 
thoughts of Jürgen Habermas and his fellow colleagues. The close 
connection to validity claims and the questions of knowledge, norms and 
sincerity connect the analysis of trust directly with the framework suggested 
by Habermas. I suggest that trust can be applied as an operational strategy of 
analysis because meaning in a social setting is not only pragmatically 
apparent in the distribution of consensus and dissent, but also concerning the 
phenomena of trust and mistrust. In a sense, we are all informal accountants 
of trust and mistrust, which can be made explicit and mapped in its social 
distribution. Therefore I suggest that trust is a critical concept. 
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i This paper has been presented at The Conference on Philosophy and The Social Sciences, Prague 2004.  
ii The formal argument would be that Luhmann’s assumption of functional equivalence presupposes 
reflexivity, and a certain kind of identity. If a relation is transitive, and non-symmetrical, as I have 
demonstrated, then it cannot be reflexive. The functional identity between trust and mistrust would not be 
possible, although they may share certain properties. Luhmann’s logic is by analogy, and even though 
rhetorically convincing, not valid. To support my argument is a further argument, that value-neutrality (which 
Luhmann presupposes by functional equivalence) would presuppose a reflexivity, which does not exist. 
 30
